Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Security Council,
- Thank you for allowing me to brief the Security Council on the progress made in the implementation of Resolution 2046, which relates to outstanding bilateral issues between Sudan and South Sudan and the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
- The Sudan crisis, which began a year ago on 16 April, remains a pressing issue. The conflict in Sudan continues to be determined by military developments on the ground, and yet, no warring party has the military means to achieve victory. Despite numerous mediation efforts, the civilian population continues to suffer the consequences of the violent confrontation between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). This conflict not only impacts bilateral relations between the Sudan and South Sudan but also has far-reaching implications for the security and humanitarian situation in Sudan’s neighbours, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa as a whole.
- South Sudan has been actively engaging in regional mediation efforts for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan, as the country is already facing a dire humanitarian situation and fears being dragged into the Sudanese war even further. The influx of over 630,000 refugees and returnees from the Sudan conflict has increased pressure on the population’s limited access to food, water, and basic health services due to years of armed conflicts, intercommunal violence, and environmental shocks.
- The conflict in the Sudan is not only a humanitarian crisis but also a severe economic challenge for South Sudan. The country, heavily reliant on its oil exports, has seen a direct impact on its economy due to the conflict in the Sudan. An incident in an area controlled by the RSF in White Nile state in early February led to a suspension in loadings and a subsequent gelling that solidified oil, halting oil production and delivery. On 16 March, Sudan’s petroleum minister declared force majeure on oil deliveries to Port Sudan. On 26 April, Sudanese authorities announced that the export of South Sudan’s crude oil through the Jabalyn pipeline would likely resume in two months. However, the severe disruption of oil delivery, the flooding of oil fields, and the uncertain security situation in the Red Sea have exacerbated an already dire economic situation in South Sudan.
Mr. President,
- I made this introduction because the conflict in the Sudan has impeded potential progress in resolving outstanding bilateral issues. The high-level committee on Abyei has not been convened since its last meeting on 9 and 10 April 2023. The lack of progress has resulted in growing frustration among the Abyei population, which feels that neither the Sudan nor South Sudan is committed to resolving the issue of Abyei. At the same time, they continue to face severe security and humanitarian challenges of their own.
- The inter-communal violence involving the Ngok Dinka, Twic Dinka and Nuer communities has threatened security in the Abyei area. In January and February, violence primarily between the Ngok Dinka and communities caused the death, as mentioned by USG Lacroix, of more than 60 people, including two UN peacekeepers and four humanitarian staff. It displaced about 3,000 people from Abyei and about 20,000 from Southern Abyei into Abyei town. In Diffra, the oil installations were left unsecured following the withdrawal of the Sudan’s oil police.
- The security situation in the Sudan has caused a complete collapse of basic services in Northern Abyei. It has also affected the delivery of basic services in Southern Abyei, with health facilities and schools last supplied in April 2023 and some of the facilities occupied by South Sudan’s People Defense Forces (SSPDF). People seeking health services come from Diffra in Northern Abyei to access the already limited and overstretched facilities in Southern Abyei. Due to inter-communal violence, Abyei has had two consecutive years of unsuccessful harvest, a situation that has been exacerbated by the impact of climate change.
- In February this year, during my joint visit to Abyei with USG Lacroix from 18 to 24 February, the Abyei Administrators from the Sudan and South Sudan deplored the humanitarian hardship the Abyei population faces. I am also concerned that the Presidential order that authorised troop deployment to quell insecurity by maintaining a buffer zone between the two contesting Dinka communities was not adhered to appropriately. The South Sudan Abyei Joint Oversight Committee Co-Chair deplored that the newly arrived SSPDF were seen engaging in direct confrontation in Rumamier against local government officials. Repeated security incidents prompted recent demonstrations in Abyei, demanding the withdrawal of SSPDF troops and justice for the victims of the killings.
- Given the status of Abyei as a demilitarised and weapons-free area, I would like to second USG Lacroix’s call on the Government of South Sudan to redeploy SSPDF troops outside the Abyei Box. I will also continue with the Force Commander of UNISFA to encourage leaders of the Twic and Ngok Dinka communities to de-escalate tensions and resolve their differences amicably and peacefully. During our engagement in Juba, the interlocutors also called for additional police to be deployed in Diffra to secure the oil infrastructure that has been abandoned by Sudan’s oil police.
Mr. President,
- The war between SAF and RSF is compounding the humanitarian and security situation in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states and fragmenting further those two territories. While large areas of South Kordofan state, including the towns of Kauda and Kulugi, are under the authority of the Sudan Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, the city of Dilling is disputed by both SPLM-N and SAF.
- A similar fragmented situation prevails in the Blue Nile state. While most of Blue Nile, including its capital, Damazin, is controlled by SAF, portions of its southern territory are under SPLM-N’s authority. In the neighbouring North Kordofan state, mostly under RSF’s control, the fighting between RSF and SAF could also spill over into South Kordofan and the Blue Nile.
- In December, the RSF attacked the village of Tukma around Dilling, the second-largest city in South Kordofan. In early January, following attacks by RSF in Dilling’s residential areas, repelled by both SPLM-N and SAF, SPLM-N took control of the city. In addition, SAF conducted airstrikes on an RSF camp in the Al-Dabaibat area, north of Dilling.
- Partially addressed by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile cannot be resolved without a permanent ceasefire in the rest of the Sudan and a political solution to the violent confrontation between SAF and RSF. Negotiations between the warring parties should pave the way for an inclusive political agreement leading to a reformed security sector and the building of a unified professional army, new institutional arrangements redefining the relationship between the so-called “centre” and its “peripheries”, and ultimately the recovery and reconstruction of the Sudan.
- In line with my Office’s mandate, I will continue to support the joint mediation efforts of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, the AU High-Level Panel on the Sudan, and IGAD. Mindful of the conflict’s consequences on the Sudan and the whole region and of the fragile internal situation in South Sudan, I will continue to engage with the Sudanese and South Sudanese stakeholders to address outstanding bilateral issues, and hopefully including the final status of Abyei.
Thank you, Mr. President.